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Note
VERITION PARTNERS MASTER FUND LTD. V. ARUBA
NETWORKS, INC.: DEAL PRICE AS A CEILING IN STATUTORY
APPRAISAL ACTIONS
ALYSSA TESTO*
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 1 the
Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the lower court properly
determined the fair value of stockholder shares in an appraisal proceeding. 2
The court held the Delaware Court of Chancery 3 abused its discretion when
it used the unaffected thirty-day market price average 4 as fair value 5 over the
deal price less synergies. 6 The court correctly held that there is no definitive
formula for determining fair value but that the deal price less synergies

© 2020 Alyssa Testo
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author dedicates this Note to her husband, Nicholas Testo. This Note, and law school in general,
would not have been possible without his unwavering love, patience, and sacrifice. Additionally,
the author wishes to thank her friends and family for their support and encouragement. The author
would also like to thank Professor William J. Moon for his guidance and invaluable feedback
throughout the writing process. Finally, the author wishes to thank the editors and staff of the
Maryland Law Review for their hard work and assistance in publishing this Note.
1. 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 130. Appraisal proceedings are cases brought by minority shareholders dissenting
from a merger who argue the deal price was inadequate. Appraisals are a statutory right that allow
for the judiciary to assess the fair value of the shares. See infra Section II.A for a more detailed
discussion.
3. This Note will refer to the Delaware Court of Chancery as the “Delaware Court of
Chancery,” the “court of chancery,” and the “chancery court” interchangeably, and the Delaware
Supreme Court as the “Delaware Supreme Court” or the “court.”
4. The unaffected thirty-day market price average is “the thirty-day average market price at
which . . . shares [were] traded before the media reported news of the [merger].” Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 129.
5. Fair Value and Fair Market Value (“FMV”) should not be confused here. Fair value is
[t]he value ascribed to stock or partnership interests in a corporation or other entity when
those interests are involuntarily sold because of the actions of the entity’s majority or
controlling owners. Fair value is used when fair market value would be inequitable to a
dissenter or involuntary seller, as in a merger or squeeze-out. The fair value of a
dissenting shareholder’s stock is generally determined without applying the marketability
or minority discounts that would apply in a fair-market-value determination.
Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Whereas FMV is “[t]he price that a seller is
willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction.
Id.
6. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 130. For a definition of deal price less synergies, see infra note 7.
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approach 7 was the best indicator of fair value because the merger was a fully
informed, 8 arm’s-length transaction, 9 that resulted from a robust sales
process. 10 The practical result of the court’s holding will likely be a decline
in appraisal proceedings, more specifically appraisal arbitrage,11 in fully
informed, arm’s-length transactions. 12 This is because the incentives of
appraisal arbitrage are removed by the Aruba holding. 13 The deal price likely
will now serve as the ceiling for fair value determinations, and the likelihood
of the court awarding a fair value over the agreed upon deal price, in fully

7. A requirement of Delaware General Corporation Law section 262 is that the determination
of fair value of shares must exclude any amount attributable to synergistic merger gains. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2018). Synergy, used in the merger context, is “the concept that the combined
value and performance of two companies will be greater than the sum of the separate individual
parts.”
Adam
Barone,
Synergy,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar.
10,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/synergy.asp. A strategic bidder in a merger transaction
generally includes synergistic value in their offered deal price. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value
Partner, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017) (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be
important is that it is widely assumed that the sales price in many M&A deals includes a portion of
the buyer’s expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to
prevail and obtain control.”). Deal price less synergies, then, is the calculation of fair value using
the agreed upon deal price of the merger minus any synergistic value included in the deal price.
8. Fully informed, in the merger context, means the level of information buyers have access
to regarding the seller’s business. The deal price is likely to be considered fair when buyers are
“fully informed” when accepting a deal price. For example, in DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court
emphasized that “a merger . . . against the back drop of a rich information base . . . is probative of
the company’s fair value.” 172 A.3d at 366 (emphasis added). Access to material, nonpublic
information also lends to a transaction being fully informed. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140.
9. An arm’s-length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated
parties,” or “a transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as
if the parties were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.” Transaction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The importance of an arm’s-length transaction is the assumption that
no conflict of interest and relatively equal bargaining power will result in a fair deal price.
10. See infra Section IV.A. A robust sales process, in this case, refers to the degree of
competition and barriers to entry in the sale process of the merger. Low barriers to entry for
potential buyers and higher degrees of competition lead to a “robust sales process” and lend support
to deal price as fair value. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (holding deal price less synergies
was indicative of fair value where six potential buyers were contacted and none were interested);
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. 2017) (finding a
competitive sale process where Silver Lake competed with interested parties “at every stage, both
pre-signing and during the go-shop”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 350, 376 ( finding a “competitive process
of bidding” where “every logical buyer” was contacted, three potential buyers expressed interest,
and two engaged in negotiations, as well as, citing “failure of other buyers to pursue the company
when they had a free chance to do so” as a factor).
11. Appraisal arbitrage is the practice of hedge funds purchasing shares of a corporation set to
be acquired in a merger with the intention of asserting appraisal rights to obtain a fair value judgment
above the deal price. Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW.
325, 325 (2017).
12. See infra Section IV.B.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
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informed, arm’s-length transactions with a robust sales process, is greatly
diminished. 14
After synthesizing Delaware’s appraisal jurisprudence, this Note calls
for the Delaware legislature to amend section 262 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law to reduce judicial uncertainty in fair value determinations. 15
Despite the chancery court’s lauded expertise in business law, the judge’s
themselves have called for changes to the Delaware appraisal process and
readily admit they are uncertain or feel unqualified to make fair value
determinations. 16 But, because the statute plainly requires the chancery court
to make the determination, they are barred by statute from utilizing neutral
valuation experts. 17 By amending the statute to mandate a court-appointed
valuation expert, judicial uncertainty in fair value determinations could be
reduced, if not eliminated. 18
I. THE CASE
Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) approached Aruba Networks, Inc.
(“Aruba”) about a potential merger 19 in August 2014. 20 Aruba proceeded to
negotiate with HP and also shopped the deal to five other bidders, but none
showed any interest. 21 After much back-and-forth negotiation, Aruba
accepted HP’s offer of $24.67 per share at a time when its stock price was
$18.37. 22 Two weeks later, news of the deal leaked to the media and Aruba
released its quarterly results, which beat analyst expectations, causing
Aruba’s stock to jump to $24.81 per share. 23 Shortly after news of the deal
leaked, Aruba and HP formally announced the merger at a price of $24.67

14. See infra Section IV.B.
15. See infra Section IV.C.
16. See infra Section IV.C.
17. See infra Section IV.C.
18. See infra Section IV.C.
19. A merger is “[t]he absorption of one organization . . . that ceases to exist into another that
retains its own name and identity and acquires assets and liabilities of the former.” Merger, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
20. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019)
(en banc) (per curiam).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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per share and a final passive market check24 was permitted, but no superior
bid emerged. 25 The deal closed on May 18, 2015. 26
Stockholders, Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. and Verition MultiStrategy Master Fund Ltd. (together, “Verition”) petitioned the Delaware
Court of Chancery for appraisal of fair value of shares in Aruba after its
merger with HP was finalized. 27 Appraisal is a shareholder’s right
guaranteed under Delaware General Corporation Law section 262. 28 Both
parties advocated for their preferred fair value calculation.29 After the trial,
the Vice Chancellor—sua sponte—requested supplemental briefing from the
parties in response to the Supreme Court of Delaware’s opinion in Dell, Inc.
v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 30 which was published
shortly after post-trial oral arguments. 31 In the supplemental briefs, Aruba
dropped deal price less synergies as its preferred fair value calculation. 32
Aruba then argued, for the first time, that its preannouncement stock price
(the thirty-day average unaffected market price) of $17.13 per share was the
fair value. 33 The court of chancery, in its post-trial opinion, agreed with
Aruba’s post-trial supplemental brief that the fair value of the stock was its
thirty-day average unaffected market price of publicly traded shares at $17.13
per share. 34 According to Vice Chancellor Laster, the thirty-day unaffected
market price was the better fair value calculation because the deal price less
synergies valuation method 35 continued to incorporate theoretical reduced
agency costs, an element of value from the merger that inflated Aruba’s value
as a going concern. 36 After the court of chancery issued its opinion, Verition
24. A market check is a search, typically conducted by the seller in a merger transaction, to
determine whether other interested buyers will bid more than the proposed deal price. Glossary of
Stock Market Terms, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/m/market-check. A market
check—whether active or passive—in a change-of-control transaction, such as the one here, is
necessary for compliance with Delaware’s Revlon Doctrine (which will not be discussed in this
Note). Kobi Kastiel, Delaware Supreme Court Holds That Revlon Does Not Require Active Market
Check,
HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Jan.
24,
2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/24/delaware-supreme-court-holds-that-revlon-does-notrequire-active-market-check/.
25. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 130.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a), (h) (2018) (granting dissenting stockholders the
statutory right to an appraisal by the court of chancery for determination of the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the merger).
29. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 131.
30. 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
31. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 131.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 7 for an explanation of the deal price less synergies valuation method.
36. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 32.
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moved for reargument, which the court denied. 37 Verition appealed to the
Delaware Supreme Court. 38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Appraisal proceedings are a statutory right granted to shareholders in
Delaware. 39 The purpose of an appraisal is to ensure petitioners “receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length
transaction,” not to ensure they receive the highest possible value. 40 Section
II.A discusses the origins of Delaware’s appraisal statute. 41 Section II.B
examines the rise of statutory appraisal cases. 42 Section II.C reviews
valuation methods utilized in appraisal proceedings. 43 Finally, Section II.D
analyzes the progression of Delaware’s use of deal price as evidence of “fair
value.” 44
A. The Delaware Appraisal Statute
Prior to the enactment of appraisal rights, major decisions about a
corporation, such as mergers, required unanimity from stockholders of the
corporation. 45 This created a veto power and often allowed for a minority
stockholder 46 to obstruct corporate action. 47 To address this problem,

37. Id. at 132 n.24.
38. Id.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018). Delaware is not the only jurisdiction to grant
appraisal rights. Shareholders dissenting from a merger have a statutory right to an appraisal in
virtually all jurisdictions. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2192 (2015).
40. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017).
41. See infra Section II.A.
42. See infra Section II.B.
43. See infra Section II.C.
44. See infra Section II.D.
45. See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934) (“At common law it was in
the power of any single stockholder to prevent a merger.”); In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., No.
7802, 1986 WL 8062, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1986) (“At common law there was no provision for
an appraisal because unanimous consent of the stockholders was necessary to warrant certain acts
such as a consolidation or merger.”).
46. A minority stockholder or minority shareholder is someone who owns less than fifty
percent of the total shares of a corporation’s stock or someone who owns shares without voting
control of the corporation. Shareholder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
47. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345,
at *3, (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“Historically, all major corporate decisions required unanimous
shareholder consent. This requirement created a veto power and allowed even a single shareholder
to obstruct corporate action.”); see also Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6
(1941) (“At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental
changes in the corporation. This made it possible for an arbitrary minority to establish a nuisance
value for its shares by refusal to coöperate [sic].”).
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legislatures enacted laws permitting corporations to effectuate fundamental
changes without a unanimous vote. 48 In return, appraisal rights were
statutorily established to compensate stockholders for the loss of veto power
and gave dissenters the right to recover the cash value of their shares. 49
In Delaware, the appraisal remedy is statutory. 50 Appraisal was
intended to provide dissenting shareholders a remedy for the loss of voting
rights in a fundamental corporate activity through “an independent judicial
determination of the fair value of their shares” being taken from them. 51 If
shareholders opt to seek appraisal, they forego their right to exchange shares
at the negotiated deal price and instead accept the fair value for their shares
as determined by the court of chancery. 52 Under section 262(b) of the
Delaware appraisal statute, appraisal rights are only available in mergers and
consolidations, 53 but the statute allows corporations to grant appraisal rights
in other specified circumstances in its certificate of incorporation. 54 For a
stockholder to have a valid appraisal claim, they must first perfect their
appraisal rights. 55 To perfect their appraisal rights, the stockholder must
deliver a separate written demand for appraisal to the corporation before the
stockholder vote on the merger. 56 A stockholder must also not vote in favor
of the merger or consent to it in writing. 57 Within 120 days following the
effective date of the merger, any stockholder who has perfected their rights
may file for appraisal in the court of chancery. 58 Through an appraisal

48. See In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., 1986 WL 8062, at *5 (“Ever since 1899 Delaware
law has permitted a stockholder’s interest to be terminated by the payment of its value in the case
of a [merger] . . . . Initially a super majority vote of all the stockholders was required, but now only
a simple majority need approve a merger . . . .”).
49. See Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) (describing
appraisal as “a limited legislative remedy developed initially as a means to compensate shareholders
of Delaware corporations for the loss of their common law right to prevent a merger or consolidation
by refusal to consent to such transactions”); In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., 1986 WL 8062, at
*5 (“The granting of appraisal rights to a dissenting stockholder . . . was given, at least in part, in
compensation for the lost right of the minority to defeat a merger.”).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018); see Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369, 374 (Del.
Ch. 1978) (“The right to an appraisal in a merger proceeding is entirely a creature of statute.”).
51. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 19 (Del. 2017)
(citing Ala. By-Prod. Corp., 657 A.2d at 258).
52. tit. 8, § 262; see Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“‘[A]
stockholder who seeks appraisal must forego all of the transactional consideration and essentially
place his investment in limbo until the appraisal action is resolved.’ As part of this risk, a minority
stockholder faces the prospect of receiving less than the [deal] price in the appraisal action.” (citing
Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547–48 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
53. tit. 8, § 262(b).
54. Id. § 262(c).
55. Id. § 262(d).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 262(a).
58. Id. § 262(e).
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proceeding, the chancery court is charged with using all relevant factors to
determine “the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.” 59 Following
its decision, the court of chancery directs payment of the appraised amount,
in addition to interest, to each dissenting stockholder. 60
B. The Rise of Statutory Appraisal Cases
The appraisal remedy was long discarded as insignificant, but that was
profoundly changed by appraisal arbitrage. 61 Appraisal arbitrage is a
common investment strategy in which stockholders, generally hedge funds,
acquire shares after an announcement of a merger, with the
specific intention of exercising the statutory stockholder appraisal
right found in [section] 262; in the subsequent appraisal action the
court awards the appraisal petitioners what the court determines to
be the fair value of the target, which, if the target was undervalued
in the transaction, represents a positive return on the arbitrage
investor’s initial investment. 62
Dissenting stockholders are also incentivized to practice appraisal arbitrage
because they are entitled to receive interest on the court’s fair value award at
an above market rate, compounded quarterly, for the period the suit was
pending. 63
The basic appraisal arbitrage opportunity granted by appraisal rights
stems from In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. 64 Section 262
only allows shareholders who abstained or voted against the merger to assert
appraisal rights. 65 In the Transkaryotic decision, the court held that investors
that buy target company shares after the record date for the vote on a merger
can still assert appraisal rights. 66 This decision gives a timing advantage to
hedge funds because the hedge funds can delay purchasing shares until after
59. Id. § 262(h).
60. Id. § 262(i).
61. See Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
89, 89 (2017) (noting that appraisal arbitrage was “[l]ong dismissed as a ‘sleepy corporate [law]
backwater’—rarely employed and economically insignificant” (quoting Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
1551, 1553 (2015))).
62. Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900–VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *1
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015).
63. tit. 8, § 262(h). 2016 amendments to section 262(h) allow corporations to prepay appraisal
claimants an amount of their choosing to reduce the accrual of interest payments. Id.
64. No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
65. tit. 8, § 262(a) (“Any stockholder . . . who has neither voted in favor of the merger . . . nor
consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled to an appraisal by the
Court of Chancery . . . .).
66. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3–*4.
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they have reviewed information on the sale process, fairness of the price, and
all other pertinent information at a time much closer to the merger date.67
The chancery court, in its opinion, acknowledged the possibility of appraisal
arbitrage but chose to defer to the legislature “to avoid the evil” of appraisal
arbitrage. 68
Following Transkaryotic, a dynamic market for appraisal rights
developed. 69 The number of appraisal claims and overall value at stake has
increased dramatically due to the tremendous growth of hedge funds using
appraisal arbitrage to take advantage of the appraisal statute.70 From 2006 to
2016, there was a consistent increase in appraisal petitions filed, 71 including
a sharp rise from 2012 to 2016, where appraisal suits in Delaware rose 267%
according to an analysis of Bloomberg Law data. 72 The ten most frequent
petitioners who brought appraisal suits were mainly hedge funds and private
equity firms that were actively pursuing arbitrage investment strategies. 73
These ten petitioners filed more than half of the 433 appraisal petitions filed
between 2006 and 2018. 74
C. Determining Fair Value
Section 262(h) established the Delaware Court of Chancery’s mandate
to determine the value of shares that qualify for appraisal. 75 The Delaware

67. Philip Richter, Robert C. Schwenkel, David N. Shine & Gail Weinstein, The Rise of
Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some Practical Implications, INSIGHTS:
CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, July 2014, at 18, 19–20.
68. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5. The Council of the Corporation
Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association made two reform proposals in 2015 which were
ultimately adopted. Wei Jiang, Reforming the Delaware Law to Address Appraisal Arbitrage,
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(May
12,
2016),
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/12/reforming-the-delaware-law-to-address-appraisalarbitrage/. The Council proposed a “de minimis exception,” which would require a minimum stake
of $1 million or 1% stock of the company to seek appraisal and an “interest reduction amendment”
that would reduce the pre-judgment interest rate paid on an award from an appraisal. Id. Notably,
the Council did not propose legislation to overrule the Transkaryotic decision. Id.
69. Kesten, supra note 61, at 104.
70. Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist
Shareholders, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 503 (2016).
71. DAVID F. MARCUS, FRANK SCHNEIDER, CHARLIE COSTELLO & YANLEI MA,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, APPRAISAL LITIGATION IN DELAWARE: TRENDS IN PETITIONS AND
OPINIONS 2006–2018 1, 4 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/publications/reports/appraisallitigation-delaware-2006-2018.
72. Michael Greene, M&A Deal Price Challenges Spiking in Delaware, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan.
17, 2017, 2:41 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/m-a-deal-pricechallenges-spiking-in-delaware.
73. Marcus, supra note 71, at 5.
74. Id.
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2018) (“[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
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Supreme Court, in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 76 explained the concept
of value from the statutory mandate:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value
of the stockholder’s proportionate interest in the corporate
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has
been taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents
this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take
into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might
enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value,
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any
other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders’ interest, but
must be considered by the agency fixing the value. 77
The baseline objective of a statutory appraisal is to value the corporation as
a whole entity, rather than as a specific fraction of shares belonging to a
particular stockholder. 78
The statute provides further that fair value shall be determined
“exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger.” 79 Therefore, value from potential synergies 80 that
will result from a merger is not considered in determining fair value. 81 Fair
value, then, is best described as “the value of the company to the stockholder
as a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.” 82

merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be
the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”).
76. 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
77. Id. at 72.
78. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *8 (Del Ch. Feb. 22, 1988), aff’d 564
A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
79. tit., 8 § 262(h).
80. See supra note 7 for an explanation of synergies.
81. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he company
must be first valued as an operating entity by application of traditional value factors, weighted as
required, but without regard to post-merger events or other possible business combinations.”); see
also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 20–21 (Del. 2017)
(describing what the Court is valuing in an appraisal proceeding); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield
Value Partner, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017) (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be
important is that it is widely assumed that the sales price in many M&A deals includes a portion of
the buyer’s expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to
prevail and obtain control.”).
82. M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
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The Court has recognized that fair value, over time, “has become a
‘jurisprudential, rather than purely economic, construct.’” 83
In Weinberger v. UOP, 84 the seminal case on Delaware statutory
appraisal rights, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a proper valuation
approach “must include proof of value by any techniques or methods which
are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court.” 85 Weinberger also signified a large shift from
prior valuation methodology by holding that valuation should include
elements of future value that are known or susceptible to proof, excluding
only speculative elements. 86 The court adopted “a more liberal, less rigid and
stylized, approach to the valuation process.” 87
The takeaway is that two important provisions from section 262 explain
“what” the Court is valuing, and “how” the court should complete the
valuation. The “what” is that the Court “shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger.” 88 The “how” is the statutory requirement that
“[i]n determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.” 89
When determining value, the court should value the corporation as an
ongoing business at the time of the merger and not as a specific fraction of
shares. 90 Therefore, the court should not apply a minority discount when a
controlling shareholder exists, nor should the court include any value from
synergies expected from the merger. 91 Once a total value is determined, the
court awards each dissenting stockholder the pro rata percentage of the
total. 92
How the court determines fair value is difficult and fact-specific because
the statute requires the court to “take into account all relevant factors,” giving

83. Dell, 177 A.3d at 20 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 367–68).
84. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
85. Id. at 713.
86. Id. This was a large shift from Delaware’s long-time reliance on the “Delaware Block
Method” which explicitly forbid elements of future value from the valuation determination. Id. at
712–13. The Delaware Block Method is a combination of three generally accepted valuation
methods: the asset approach, the market approach, and the earnings approach. In re Radiology
Associates, Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. Ch. 1991). While the courts infrequently use
the Delaware Block Method after Weinberger, it is still considered an acceptable method for valuing
a corporation. Id.; see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (noting that
Weinberger did not “abolish the block formula, only its exclusivity as a tool of valuation”).
87. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 8 § 262(h) (2018).
89. Id.
90. Dell, 177 A.3d at 20.
91. Id. at 20–21.
92. Id. at 21.
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consideration to “proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise
admissible in court.” 93 After analyzing all relevant factors, the court may use
a single valuation metric or two or more metrics by apportioning weight
among a variety of methodologies.94 The appraisal process is flexible by
design because every entity is different and every merger is different. 95
Regardless of the number of methodologies used or the weight given to each,
the chancery court must “justify its methodology (or methodologies)
according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial
principles.” 96 Because appraisals are imperfect, the chancery court’s findings
generally will be upheld so long as they are logical and grounded in relevant,
acceptable financial methods. 97
Post-Weinberger, there are three recurring valuation techniques used in
appraisal proceedings: (1) discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analyses; (2)
valuations based on comparables (e.g., comparable companies or comparable
acquisitions); and (3) deference to the deal price.98 Experts and Delaware
Courts rely heavily on DCF analyses over other methodologies. 99
1. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
Delaware courts most frequently use DCF analysis to determine the fair
value of shares subject to appraisal despite recognizing concerns about the
subjectivity of DCF models. 100 The Delaware Supreme Court held in DFC
93. tit., 8 § 262(h); Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
94. Dell, 177 A.3d at 22.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id. at 22–23; see also DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346,
348–49 (Del. 2017) (“[T]his Court must give deference to the Court of Chancery if its determination
of fair value has a reasonable basis in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to
determining the value of corporations and their stock.”); M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d
790, 795 (Del. 1999) (“The discretion to weigh the evidence [in a statutory appraisal proceeding]
belongs to the Court of Chancery with our review one of abuse of that discretion.” (quoting In re
Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1221 (Del. 1992))); In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del.
1992) (recognizing the Delaware Supreme Court defers to the Court of Chancery’s findings due to
its expertise in appraisal cases); Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972) (noting the
Delaware Supreme Court will not ignore findings made by the Court of Chancery “[i]f they are
sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive
process . . . even though independently [the Court may] have reached opposite conclusions”).
98. Marcus, supra note 71, at 2.
99. Id. at 10; see also Crescent/Mach I P’ship, L.P. v. Turner, Nos. 17455-VCN, 17711-VCN,
2007 WL 2801387, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“Although it is appropriate to consider all
accepted methodologies, the Court tends to favor the discounted cash flow method . . . .”).
100. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999) (“The discounted
cash flow methodology has been relied upon frequently . . . in other statutory appraisal
proceedings.”); Onti, Inc. v. IntegraBank, 751 A.2d 904, 916 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[S]ince the
abolishment of the Delaware Block method for appraisals in 1983, this Court frequently has
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Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 101 that a DCF model is
generally most helpful in transactions where there is not an observable
market price because “a single person’s own estimates of the cash flows
are . . . a good faith estimate by a single, reasonably informed person to
predict the future.” 102 The fundamental principle of DCF analysis is that the
present value of a corporation’s projected cash flows is equal to the
corporation’s value. 103 DCF analysis uses three components: 104 (1) cash flow
projections, 105 (2) terminal value, 106 and (3) the discount rate. 107 Once these
three components are determined, the cash flows and terminal value are
discounted to present value using the discount rate and added together to
derive a total present value of cash flows.108 Then, the value of non-operating
employed the discounted cash flow [approach] as at least one method of valuation.”). But see Dell,
177 A.3d at 37–38 (“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is
no credible market information and no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—all
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”).
101. 172 A.3d 346, 370 (Del. 2017).
102. Id. at 370.
103. Neal v. Ala. By-Prods. Corp., CIV. A. No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug.
1, 1990).
104. In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“The DCF model
entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when,
over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of the
projection period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital
with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated
terminal or residual value.”).
105. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1999 WL 65042, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan.
29, 1999) (“The first step of DCF is to project the company’s future income stream.”). The chancery
court in In re Radiology Associates notes that “[t]he quality of the projection as to the future benefits
over some period . . . is central to the reliability of the underlying methodology of the [DCF]
method.” 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991).
106. The terminal value is the present value of all of the company’s future cash flows beginning
after the specific projection period.
Terminal Value, CORP. FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/terminal-value/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2020). Terminal value calculations have been accepted by courts when derived as present
value of the company’s cash flows projected in perpetuity or determined by a capitalized earnings
approach. Compare Onti v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 923 (Del. Ch. 1999) (calculating terminal
value using “the Constant Growth Valuation Model . . . which is widely accepted as the best, even
if imperfect, method to determine a terminal value for a discounted cash flow analysis”) with
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *21 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (calculating terminal
value using the capitalized earnings approach with an average of three years of historical earnings
and a capitalization multiple of 12), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
107. In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d at 490, 492. The discount rate determines
the present value of the annual cash flows for the projection period and the terminal value. Id. “The
selection of an appropriate discount rate has a profound effect on the share price in an appraisal
action.” Crescent/Mach I P’ship, L.P. v. Turner, Nos. 17455-VCN, 17711-VCN, 2007 WL
2801387, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
108. See Cede & Co., 1999 WL 65042, at *5 (“[B]y adding the current year’s cash flows to the
discounted values of each future year’s income (including the last year’s lump-sum terminal value),
one arrives at the net present value (“NPV”) of the enterprise.”).
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assets 109 is added and the total is divided by the number of outstanding shares
to reach the fair value per share of the company. 110 The DCF analysis
“purports to represent the present value of [the corporation’s] cash flow”
which reflects the shareholder’s proportionate “value without need for an
adjustment.” 111
2. Valuations Based on Comparables
Valuations based on comparables such as a Comparable Companies
Approach or Comparable Acquisitions (Transactions) Approach are
sometimes used to determine fair value. 112 The comparables approach is
based on the same premise as the DCF method, except instead of directly
estimating the company’s future cash flows and reducing them to present
value, the comparables method infers the future growth of the subject
company using future expected cash flows from the market’s expectations
about comparable companies or transactions. 113 Comparable analyses
determine the value of a company using the metrics of other businesses or
transactions of similar size in the same industry, using the assumption that
similar companies or transactions will have similar valuations. 114 The
comparable companies valuation method involves several steps including:
(1) finding comparable, publicly traded companies that have
reviewable financial information; (2) calculating the ratio between
the trading price of the stocks of each of those companies and some
recognized measure reflecting their income . . . ; (3) correcting
these derived ratios to account for differences, such as in capital
structure, between the public companies and the target company
being valued; and finally, (4) applying the average multiple of the
comparable companies to the relevant income measurement of the
target company. 115

109. Non-operating assets are assets that are not essential to a company’s ongoing business
operations but may still generate income or provide a return on investment. James Chen, NonOperating
Asset,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr.
29,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonoperatingasset.asp. For example, an owned parcel of
land with no plans for building or usage in the near future is a non-operating asset until it is used.
Id.
110. See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d at 495 (“This Court clearly must add the
value of non-operating assets . . . .”).
111. Id. at 494.
112. Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.
113. In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713–CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del.
Ch. July 18, 2012).
114. James Chen, Comparable Company Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/comparable-company-analysis-cca.asp.
115. Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Civil Action No. 6247-VCP, 2013 WL 3793896,
at *6 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013).
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The comparable transactions analysis is similar to the comparable
companies analysis. The court of chancery in Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA
Financial, Inc. 116 described a comparable transactions analysis as,
“identifying similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the company at issue to
ascertain a value.” 117 As with the comparable companies analysis, “[t]he
utility of the comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to the
‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and the companies used
for comparison.’” 118 Because the selection of comparators requires a
necessary degree of subjective judgment, the court is directed to “closely
evaluate whether a party who relies on a comparable transactions [or
companies] analysis has met its burden of persuasion.” 119
The comparables approach is more useful for valuation in competitive
industries with a large number of similar entities. 120 Despite comparable
analyses being credited as a valid valuation tool, it is not used much by the
court when determining fair value. 121
3. Deference to the Deal Price
When considering the agreed upon deal price for the merger transaction
as fair value, the court looks to the company’s stock market dynamics, the
sale process, and the flow of information between parties to the
transaction. 122 But, the court is not required to give any amount of weight to
the deal price. 123 From 2006 to 2018, the court relied on deal price in
determining fair value in thirty-eight percent of opinions, making it the
second-most utilized methodology after DCF analysis. 124 Deal price as fair
value is discussed at length in the next Section. 125

116. 939 A.2d 34 (Del. Ch. 2007).
117. Id. at 54.
118. Id. (quoting In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., C.A. No. 18696-NC, 2005 WL 43994, at
*17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005)).
119. Id. at 54.
120. See In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713–CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he utility of a [comparables] method depends on actually having
companies that are sufficiently comparable that their trading multiples provide a relevant insight
into the subject company’s own growth prospects. When there are a number of corporations
competing in a similar industry, the method is easiest to deploy reliably.”).
121. Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.
122. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23 (Del. 2017).
123. Id.
124. Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.
125. See infra Section II.D.
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D. The Delaware Court’s Increasing Reliance on Deal Price as
Evidence of “Fair Value”
In Union Illinois 1995 Investment Ltd. Partnership v. Union Financial
Group, Ltd., 126 the Delaware Court of Chancery initially held “[t]he [deal]
price [was] the most reliable evidence of fair value.” 127 Six years later, the
Delaware Supreme Court took a firm stance against the use of deal price as
fair value in an appraisal action in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP. 128
Then, just three years after Golden Telecom, under similar facts, the
Delaware courts began a slow return back to approval of deal price in Huff
Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc. 129 Subsequent cases took the same
approach as CKx, relying exclusively on the deal price to determine fair
value, in part because other valuation methods were unreliable. 130 Beginning
in 2015 with LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corp., 131
Delaware courts have consistently relied on deal price as the “best indicator”
of fair value. 132 This is likely due, in part, to In re Appraisal of
Ancestry.com, 133 which removed any restrictions on using deal price only in

126. 847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. 2004).
127. Id. at 357–58.
128. 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010).
129. C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11–15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). “In the
absence of comparable companies or transactions to guide a comparable companies analysis or a
comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable projections to discount in a DCF analysis, I
rely on the [deal] price as the best and most reliable indication of CKx’s value.” Id. at 11.
130. See LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL
4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (finding that “the sales process in this instance was thorough
and that the [deal] price less synergies provides the most reliable method of determining the fair
value of the petitioner’s shares” because the DCF analysis, comparable companies approach, and
comparable transactions approach are not reliable.); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No.
8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *14, *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (finding that the sale process
was “comprehensive” and that, at the same time, “there [was] no reliable data to input into a DCF
or comparable companies model”).
131. C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
132. See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 376 (Del. 2017)
(“[W]e cannot sustain the Chancellor’s decision to give only one-third weight to the deal price . . . .”
(emphasis added)); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at
*40 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (“I ‘defer’ to deal price . . . because that is what the
evidence . . . requires.”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL
6164771, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (“[Deal] price . . . [is] the best indicator of fair value of
BMC . . . .”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL
4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[Deal] price less synergies provides the most reliable
method . . . .”); Merlin Partners LP, 2015 WL 2069417, at *16 (“[Deal] price appears to be the best
estimate of value . . . .”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL
399726, at *24 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“[Deal] price . . . is the best indicator of Ancestry’s fair
value . . . .”).
133. C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015).
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circumstances where other valuation methods are unreliable.134 The court’s
trend of using deal price as fair value continued in its 2017 opinions in
DFC 135 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd. 136
The court determined in DFC that “economic principles suggest[ed] that the
best evidence of fair value was the deal price” in the case of an arm’s-length
merger arising out of a “robust market search” free of any “hint of selfinterest.” 137 In Dell, the Court went even further to say:
[W]hen the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers
to entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any
topping bidder to have the support of [the founder]’s own votes is
so compelling, then failure to give the resulting [deal] price heavy
weight . . . abuses even the wide discretion afforded the Court of
Chancery . . . . 138
Despite its increasing reliance on deal price as fair value, the court’s
most recent decisions have continued to hold strong to the ideas that judicial
discretion remains important, judges must take into account “all relevant
factors,” and the court must not give presumption to deal price as fair
value. 139 The culmination of the case law surrounding deal price as fair value
has led to the conclusion that in the proper circumstances, the courts can
“select deal price to measure fair value, even if one or more other valuation
techniques are reasonably reliable, simply because the deal price may be the
‘most’ reliable evidence of fair value.” 140
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the court of chancery’s fair value
determination and held that the court abused its discretion in determining
Aruba’s thirty-day average unaffected market price was the fair value of

134. Id. at *23 (relying exclusively on deal price as fair value despite acknowledging the DCF
analysis was reliable).
135. 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
136. 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
137. DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
138. Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
139. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 366 (“[N]ot only do we see no license in the statute for creating a
presumption that the resulting [deal] price in such a situation is the ‘exclusive,’ ‘best,’ or ‘primary’
evidence of fair value, we do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to craft, on a general basis,
the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind.”); Dell,
177 A.3d at 21–23 (noting the statutory burden placed on the chancery court to consider “all relevant
factors” and echoing the doubts expressed in DFC on invoking a presumption).
140. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael V. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal
Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP PENN. L. (2018),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1954.
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shares. 141 The court reasoned that the decision to disregard the deal price less
synergies as the proper fair value determination was “rooted in an erroneous
factual finding that lacked record support.” 142 On remand, the Delaware
Supreme Court ordered a final judgement for Verition, awarding them $19.10
per share, the deal price less synergies. 143
In coming to this conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court entertained
a number of corporate finance theories to properly evaluate fair value. The
court addressed the unaffected thirty-day average market price adopted by
the court of chancery but discarded its use due to its time delay and lack of
developed record on whether the stock price was an adequate representation
of fair value. 144 The court also considered the court of chancery’s record on
a DCF analysis, comparable companies and comparable transactions
analyses, and deal price less synergies. 145 In the end, the court determined
that a deal price less synergies approach in a fully informed, arm’s-length
transaction following a robust sales process is the best determination of fair
value and that relying on the average unaffected market price of the seller’s
stock was not a reliable fair value determination. 146
To support its determination that deal price less synergies was the best
indicator of fair value, the court first addressed the court of chancery’s
reasoning as to why it decided not to use deal price less synergies. 147 The
Vice Chancellor posited in his lower court opinion that to meet statutory
requirements an additional deduction from the deal price was necessary to
account for “reduced agency costs” that arise from a merger. 148 The court
reasoned that while reduced agency costs is an added value in private equity
deals, that was not the case here, because Aruba’s public stockholders were
not being replaced with a concentrated group of owners as is the case in
private equity deals. 149 Instead, the HP-Aruba merger would simply swap
out Aruba’s set of public stockholders for HP’s set of public stockholders,
which would not create reduced agency costs. 150 Further, the court cited that
neither party presented any evidence to indicate that any part of the deal price

141. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 129–30 (Del.
2019) (en banc) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 130.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 139–40.
145. Id. at 142.
146. Id. at 139–42
147. Id. at 133–34.
148. Id. The reduced agency cost theory is that “the acquisition would reduce agency costs
essentially because the resulting consolidation of ownership and control would align the interests of
Aruba’s mangers and its public stockholders,” and, thus, add value to the company. Id.
149. Id. at 134.
150. Id.
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involved the potential for agency cost reductions that were not already
included in its synergies estimate. 151 The chancery court ignored the reality
that HP’s synergies estimate likely already priced any agency cost reduction
it may have expected.152 In addition, the record provided no reason to suspect
those estimates omitted any additional added value HP thought it could
achieve from the merger. 153 Because of these factors, the Delaware Supreme
Court considered Aruba’s synergies estimate accurate and did not require
further deduction of reduced agency costs. 154
The Delaware Supreme Court next dispelled the lower court’s reading
of DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 155 and Dell, Inc. v.
Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 156 that compelled its “rote
reliance on market prices.” 157 The court said “the trial judge’s sense that
those decisions somehow compelled him to make the decision he did was not
supported by any reasonable reading of those decisions or grounded in any
direct citation to them,” and pointed to the Delaware judiciary’s long history,
even prior to DFC and Dell, of “giving important weight to market-tested
deal prices,” involving a public company sold at a substantial premium after
the deal is shopped around to fair and viable bidders. 158 Here, Aruba
approached other logical buyers before signing the deal with HP, and HP had
private information not available to the public when they made an offer above
the then current market price of shares. 159 The court placed great emphasis
on market efficiency and recognized that a buyer is in a strong position to
properly value the seller when it has material, nonpublic information about
the seller, as was the case here when HP offered a premium purchase price
of Aruba. 160 The court determined that the deal price “should be given
considerable weight . . . absent deficiencies in the deal process.” 161 The court
also acknowledged that while the price a stock trades at in an efficient market
is an important indicator of fair value, when the deal is further informed by a
buyer negotiating at arm’s-length, using confidential, non-public
information, the deal price that results is even more likely to be indicative of
fair value. 162
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 135.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 137–39.

2020]

VERITION PARTNERS V. ARUBA NETWORKS, INC.

1075

Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the court of chancery
created due process and fairness problems by requesting post-trial briefing
on the unaffected thirty-day average market price because “the extent to
which the market price approximated fair value was never subjected to the
crucible of pretrial discovery, expert depositions, cross-expert rebuttal,
expert testimony at trial, and cross-examination at trial.” 163 In conclusion,
the court determined the deal price less synergies calculation of Aruba’s fair
value was supported by “abundant record evidence,” and ordered a final
judgment for Verition in the amount of $19.10 per share (the deal price less
synergies) plus interest. 164
IV. ANALYSIS
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the chancery court abused its discretion
in using Aruba’s thirty-day unaffected average market price, rather than deal
price less synergies, as fair value of shareholders’ going concern in a fully
informed, arm’s-length merger. 165 Section IV.A discusses why the Court
made the correct judgment in Aruba. 166 The court made the correct judgment
because it followed Delaware precedent, acknowledged that market-tested
deal prices are the best indicator of fair value in a robust sales process and a
fully informed, arm’s-length transaction, and removed the uncertainty of
some corporate finance methodologies regularly employed in circumstances
of non-efficient markets. 167 Section IV.B considers why the number of
statutory appraisal cases in Delaware will likely decline due to the Court’s
holding in Aruba. 168 Finally, Section IV.C explains why the Delaware
legislature should amend Delaware General Corporation Law section 262 to
avoid uncertainty in future fair value determinations. 169
A. The Deleware Supreme Court’s Holding Is Correct
The court in Aruba correctly determined the Delaware Court of
Chancery abused its discretion in using the unaffected average thirty-day
market price over deal price less synergies because the chancery court failed
to recognize prior Delaware case law’s emphasis on well-informed deal
prices following a non-conflicted, robust sales process. 170 The Delaware
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 130.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
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Supreme Court also properly recognized that an appraisal must be flexible
due to the uniqueness of each merger. 171 Finally, the court correctly
acknowledged that an efficient market, 172 as well as finance professionals,
are best suited to make valuation determinations.173
1. The Court’s Holding Is Consistent with Precedent and Recognizes
an Appraisal Must Be Flexible
The Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that it will not adopt a
presumption that the deal price reflects fair value because “Section 262(h)
unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to perform an independent
evaluation of ‘fair value’ at the time of a transaction.” 174 The court refuses
to adopt such a presumption because each merger is unique, and, thus,
creating a presumption or a single way to value a merger would be a
fallacy. 175 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has a long history of
giving important emphasis to market-tested deal prices, particularly in
efficient markets. 176
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in DFC Global Corp. v.
Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event
Driven Master Fund Ltd. lean toward acceptance of deal price as the primary,
if not exclusive, means of measuring fair value, while retaining judicial
discretion to use other methods where the sales process is not robust. 177
Factors the supreme court has found compelling when relying on deal price
as the most reliable indication of fair value include an open and arm’s-length

171. See infra Section IV.A.1.
172. A market is described as efficient
if it has many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; “highly active trading”; and if
information about the company is widely available and easily disseminated to the
market. . . . In these circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly
available information about a company, and in trading the company’s stock, recalibrates
its price to reflect the market’s adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 25 (Del. 2017) (quoting
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 373–74 (Del. 2017)).
173. See infra Section IV.A.2.
174. Golden Telecom, Inc., v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217 (Del. 2010).
175. Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (“This Court has relied on the statutory requirement that the Court of
Chancery consider ‘all relevant factors’ to reject requests for the adoption of a presumption that the
deal price reflects fair value if certain preconditions are met . . . .”); Golden Telecom, Inc., 11 A.3d
at 217–18 (noting that requiring a presumption for deal price as fair value, “even in the face of a
pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the
statute”).
176. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 366 (discussing the court of chancery’s proven record “in exercising
its discretion to give the deal price predominant, and indeed exclusive weight, when it determines,
based on the precise facts before it that led to the transaction, that the deal price is the most reliable
evidence of fair value”); see cases cited supra note 132.
177. DFC, 172 A.3d at 366–67; Dell, 177 A.3d at 21–24.
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transaction process, 178 the buyer’s easy access to non-public information, 179
a robust and fair sale process (often a non-conflicted, open market check), 180
and a well-functioning, efficient market. 181 In comparison, the court found
the deal price was not reliable evidence of fair value in Global GT LP v.
Golden Telecom, Inc. 182 because the transaction was conflicted and did not
welcome buyers not already tied to the company’s major stockholders.183 In
Golden Telecom, the seller (Golden Telecom) “did not engage in any sales
178. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (noting that the individuals who ran the sales process were
“independent, experienced directors and armed with the power to say ‘no’”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 376
(finding no conflict of interest in the sale from the record); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin.,
Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 59 (Del. Ch. 2007) (deferring to the deal price where an arm’s-length transaction
was conducted).
179. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (observing that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price
because the deal price was “informed by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, nonpublic information”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 357–
58 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2005) (holding the deal price was the best indicator of fair value because the
sales process “involved the broad dissemination of confidential information to a large number of
prospective buyers.”).
180. The transaction in DFC and other cases where the court of chancery has found the deal
price was the most reliable evidence of fair value involved a robust and fair sale process, which
often included a non-conflicted, open market check. DFC, 172 A.3d at 351; see, e.g., Dell, 177
A.3d at 35 (explaining that Dell’s sale process presented “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach
to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell’s own
votes”); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at *27–*31
(Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (noting the “well-constructed and fairly implemented auction process”);
Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at
*33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (deferring to deal price because “[t]he Company ran a sale process
that generated reliable evidence of fair value”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No.
8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (finding the deal price to be the best
indicator of fair value because it came from an “arm’s-length transaction negotiated over multiple
rounds of bidding among interested buyers”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A.
No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *25 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[T]he [m]erger process was
thorough and supports my reliance on the [deal] price as an indication of Ramtron’s fair value.”);
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 8590-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *17 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 30, 2015) (asserting that any valuation method other than deal price is second best to derive
fair value when “the market prices a company as the result of a competitive and fair auction”); In
re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan.
30, 2015) (“[B]ecause the sales process here was robust, I find fair value in these circumstances best
represented by the [deal] price.”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013
WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (“The record . . . support[s] a conclusion that the
process by which CKx was marketed to potential buyers was thorough, effective, and free from any
spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”), aff’d 2015 WL 631586 (Del. 2015). These cases from
approximately 2013 to 2017 mark a shift from earlier Delaware case law, which deferred less to
deal prices, even with a robust sales process. See, e.g., Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11
A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) (“Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer—conclusively or
presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional
process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of
our precedent.”).
181. DFC, 172 A.3d at 349, 359; see supra note 172 for an explanation of efficient markets.
182. 993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
183. Id. at 508.

1078

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1057

efforts at all and instead concentrated solely on getting as good a deal as it
could” from a single buyer (VimpelCom). 184 But, Golden Telecom’s two
largest shareholders owned more of VimpelCom than Golden Telecom,
making the singular sale effort problematic due to major stockholders’
conflicted interest in the transaction, and made the deal price non-reflective
of fair value. 185 In DFC, the court held that the deal price should have been
afforded greater weight in the fair value determination because there was an
efficient market, no conflict of interest, every logical buyer had been
approached about the deal, and there were no flaws in the sales process that
could lead one to be suspicious that the deal price was not reflective of fair
value. 186 Similarly, in Dell, the Supreme Court held that stock price and deal
price—both market-based indicators of value—are indicative of fair value
when the market is efficient and “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to
all logical buyers,” and a chance for the majority shareholder’s support is
evidenced in the sales process. 187
The court decided Aruba correctly because the circumstances were
similar enough to both DFC and Dell to also consider the deal price to be
reliable evidence of fair value. Aruba shopped the deal and approached a
number of logical bidders, the market was efficient as evidenced by its nearimmediate reactions to published quarterly results, and Aruba engaged in a
passive market check after the final merger agreement that did not bring forth
a superior bid. 188 Because the Aruba transaction had all the factors the Court
relied on in DFC—for example, non-conflicted, open market check; robust
public information; and a fair sale process—the Delaware Supreme Court
correctly held that the chancery court abused its discretion by not using the
deal price as evidence of fair value. 189
2. The Court’s Holding Properly Acknowledges an Efficient Market
Is Better Situated to Make Valuation Determinations
The basic principle of appraisals—that a judicial proceeding can supply
a more reliable valuation of shares than a market process—seems absurd. An
efficient market and business professionals with knowledge and expertise to
make corporate finance calculations that best represent the fairest deal price
are better situated than the court to determine fair value of shares. In fact,
allowing courts to value a company without any showing of process-based

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. DFC, 172 A.3d at 376.
187. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. 2017).
188. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019)
(en banc) (per curiam).
189. Id. at 138–40.
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wrongdoing or conflicted transactions goes entirely against the Delaware
Corporate Law’s strong presumption that competitive markets are the best
authorities of value. 190 Corporate finance theories reflect the belief that the
collective judgment of people with an incentive to estimate an asset’s future
cash flows value and access to public information will produce a more
reliable value than the view of a single analyst. 191 The Delaware Supreme
Court has endorsed reliance on efficient markets for a long time. 192
Additionally, many corporate finance methods, such as DCF analysis,
involve a number of subjective inputs and guesswork that can vary in
accuracy, and the efficient market and those professionals who have
incentive to reach the most fair deal price are better situated to make these
calculations as opposed to a legal-trained judge. 193
DFC and Dell recognized that, absent deficiencies in the deal process,
the deal price should be given considerable weight when the buyer is in
possession of material, nonpublic information because the buyer is uniquely
incentivized to properly value the seller when agreeing to purchase the
company. 194 In Dell, the court decided the court of chancery improperly
ignored the efficient market hypothesis and overturned the lower court’s
decision. 195 In Aruba, the chancery court below used the thirty-day
unaffected average market price, meaning the thirty-day average of the price
at which the shares traded before the media reported news of the merger. 196
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected that fair value determination because
the unaffected price was several months before the valuation date, and the
buyer had material, non-public information that would not be reflected in the
190. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1602 (2015).
191. William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls
for Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 88 (2018); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 24 (discussing
the efficient market hypothesis which “teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is
generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst”); DFC, 172
A.3d at 373 (describing the price produced by an efficient market as “informative of fair value”);
id. at 373 n.144 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available
information about the value of each security.” (quoting RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 214 (2008))).
192. Dell, 177 A.3d at 24; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (noting that “the relationship between
market valuation and fundamental valuation has been strong historically”); id. at 370 n.121 (“[T]he
extent to which company valuations based on the fundamental approach have matched stock market
values over the past four decades is remarkable.” (quoting TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION:
MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 326 (2010))).
193. Dell, 177 A.3d at 7; DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Like any factor relevant to a company’s future
performance, the market’s collective judgment of the effect of regulatory risk may turn out to be
wrong, but established corporate finance theories suggest that the collective judgment of the many
is more likely to be accurate than any individual’s guess.”).
194. DFC, 172 A.3d at 367; Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
195. Dell, 177 A.3d at 24.
196. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 132.
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market price. 197 Therefore, the court decided correctly because it honored
Delaware’s precedence of reliance on an efficient market and allowed for the
business professionals, with access to material, non-public information, to
make the more accurate valuation.
B. The Court’s Holding Will Likely Result in a Decline in Appraisal
Suits
Because the trilogy of DFC, Dell, and Aruba collectively held that in a
robust market transaction deal price less synergies is strong evidence of fair
value, the court of chancery, moving forward, will likely not award more than
the deal price and, in fact, will likely award less than the deal price because
synergies must be removed. 198 Appraisal arbitrage cases are brought with the
hope that the court will find fair value to be greater than the deal price.199 In
a post-Aruba world, an appraisal case born from a non-conflicted, efficient
market transaction will likely result in a court finding the fair value of shares
to be the deal price or less, once synergies are subtracted. Unless convincing
evidence exists to show the transaction was conflicted, the market was
inefficient, or a corporation failed their due diligence requirement, Delaware
courts will likely use the fully informed, arm’s-length deal price as a fair
value ceiling because synergies must then be deducted to determine fair
value. Deal price as a fair value ceiling supplies little incentive for hedge
funds to engage in appraisal arbitrage as there is little hope for a valuation
higher than the deal price. As a result, the Delaware Chancery Court will
likely see an overall decline in appraisal proceedings moving forward.
From a public policy standpoint, a decline in appraisal arbitrage could
lead to negative results. Appraisal rights can serve as a check on abuse by
corporate directors, controlling shareholders, and other insiders in merger
transactions, just as the market serves as a check on general corporate
governance. 200 A decline in this check function, then, could have widesweeping negative effects on market efficiency and trust in the market.
But, because the DFC, Dell, and Aruba trilogy puts a heavy emphasis
on arm’s-length transactions completed in a robust market, fewer appraisals
could also have positive end results. Appraisal arbitrage will not be attractive
in instances of an unconflicted, fair price merger; whereas, mergers done in
conflicted circumstances or objectively priced below fair value will
incentivize appraisal arbitrageurs to seek appraisal and continue to serve as
the market check. 201
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 142.
See supra Section II.B for a discussion of appraisal arbitrage.
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 190, at 1598.
Id. at 1599.
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Another positive from a likely decrease in appraisal suits is the lessening
of criticism placed on appraisal arbitrage. Many arbitrage critics argue that
the practice has turned into a burden of nuisance litigation from opportunistic
investors. 202 Others comment, similarly, that appraisal arbitrage creates
uncertainty for an acquiring corporation and injects risk into the deal. 203 This
uncertainty creates “incentives for buyers to lower their price in anticipation
of having to pay appraisal arbitragers post-closing and therefore shift[s] value
away from long-term stockholders toward short-term arbitragers without
advancing the public policy rationale for appraisal rights.” 204
Thus, the likely decline in appraisal arbitrage will produce a more
positive than negative end result. The appraisal remedy was created to
compensate for a loss of voting rights to dissenting stockholders.205
Arbitrageurs by definition do not need such compensation because they
purchase the dissenting shares after the record date. 206 Therefore,
opportunistic arbitrageurs undermine the intent of the appraisal remedy and
the decline in appraisal arbitrage following Aruba will likely lead to positive
outcomes by returning the appraisal remedy to its originally contemplated
purpose.
C. The Delaware Legislature Should Amend Section 262 to Reduce
Uncertainty in Fair Value Determinations
The Delaware legislature should amend section 262 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law because the current law unwisely gives the
chancery court judges full discretion to make their own corporate finance
calculations to determine fair value, in addition to considering the expert
calculations put forth by each party. Delaware judges are renowned for their
expertise in business matters. 207 Despite this, it is unrealistic to expect judges
to do a better job valuing companies than competitive markets or
professionals with insider information. 208 This flaw is evidenced by the
202. Id. at 1600. The authors note that there is no empirical evidence supporting this fear, but
it nonetheless remains a criticism of appraisal arbitrage. Id.
203. Stanley Onyeador, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose Need
to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 356 (2017).
204. Daniel G. Dufner et al., Increasing Hostility Towards Appraisal Arbitrage, WHITE & CASE
LLP (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications
/alert-increasing-hostility-towards-appraisal-arbitrage.pdf.
205. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
207. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (“Delaware chancery judges are known for their
expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation for its sophistication in
corporate law.”)
208. Delaware Court of Chancery judges have expressed frustration with this expectation placed
upon them. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc. C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726,
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indecision of Vice Chancellor Laster in Aruba, and the Delaware Supreme
Court’s highly critical opinion of his findings in the case on appeal. 209
Considering the imperfect and highly subjective methods used in corporate
finance, it is likely better that, where possible, a law-trained judge is not the
individual making an estimate of fair value based on their own calculations
or “widely divergent partisan expert testimony.” 210
The supreme court in DFC and Dell acknowledged the mistakes made
by chancery court judges in their fair value estimate calculations, along with
the difficulties judges face when tasked with determining fair value.211 The
DFC court recognized that the chancery court may be enticed to take every
valuation method put forth by the varying briefs and expert reports on either
side, give each method equal weight, and then label the average of those the
fair value. 212 Likewise, the Dell court described appraisals as “odd” and
difficult because the burden “falls on the [trial] judge to determine fair value,
using ‘all relevant factors’” while “considering the trial presentations and
submissions of parties who have starkly different objectives: petitioners
contend fair value far exceeds the deal price, and the company argues that
fair value is the deal price or lower.” 213 It is not contested that a lot is being
asked of chancery court judges in appraisal proceedings. 214 The Delaware
legislature should consider removing the burden from judges to make fair
value determinations because they “may not [have] a background well-suited
to the [appraisal] process,” and are often asked to make difficult
determinations that may be outside of their expertise. 215
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not outright
incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an auction sale,
aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value.”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc.,
C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (noting the absurdity of a
law-trained judge being asked to “substitute his own appraisal for those of . . . valuation experts” in
a number of arenas).
209. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL, 2018
WL 922139, at *53–*54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), rev’d 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019); Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 139–41.
210. Dell, 177 A.3d at 35; Id. at 38 (observing the 1100 variable input values in the DCF
analysis); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 358 (noting the “sharp divide” between expert estimates of
fair value due to disputes about the “proper inputs and methods” for a DCF analysis).
211. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 361 (explaining “the Court of Chancery acknowledged that it had
mistakenly included” modified instead of unmodified estimates in its value determination).
212. Id. at 388.
213. Dell, 177 A.3d at 19–20 (quoting In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at
*1).
214. See Eric L. Talley, Finance in the Courtroom: Appraising Its Growing Pains, DEL. LAW.,
Summer 2017, at 16–17 (“[U]nlike highly trained (and highly remunerated) investment bankers—
whose job requires generating a ‘football field’ range of discounted cash flow (DCF) valuations—
a judge presiding over an appraisal proceeding must conjure up a single number at the end of the
process.”).
215. In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *1.
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Additionally, whether or not judges are capable of understanding the
valuation process, corporate law generally disapproves of the judiciary
forcing its own opinion on whether something is a good business decision. 216
The use of deal price, when it is a product of arm’s-length negotiating, shaped
in the “crucible of objective market reality,” 217 has acquired (non-mandated)
deference from judges following the DFC, Dell, and Aruba trilogy and
provides a convenient reference point for judges that does not require lengthy
corporate finance valuation metrics. This is a move in the right direction
toward alleviating judicial confusion in the value determination process;
however, the solution could be to go one step further and amend the statute
itself. The court, at one time, experimented with retaining an independent
expert to advise and consult on appraisal matters, and should go back to this
in order to remove calculation responsibilities from the judges. 218
Independent experts were essentially required under the appraisal statute
before 1976, when an appraisal case was initially determined by a courtappointed appraiser. 219 The change to section 262, through an amendment in
1976, allowed for the court to solely appraise the value of shares. 220 This
change was denoted as a cost-saving measure. 221
The use of an independent expert is not a new idea and has been
suggested a number of times. 222 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the
idea of an independent expert witness for valuation matters in Cede & Co v.
Technicolor, Inc., 223 because “appointment of a combination special
appraisal master/independent expert witness and the delegation of
responsibility for valuing the Technicolor shares is unlawful because it is
contrary to the statutory mandate that ‘the Court [of Chancery] shall appraise
the shares.’” 224
A likely reason the statute has not yet been amended is the landscape of
Delaware corporate lawmaking. Local interest groups, made up largely of
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association, control much
216. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83 (2004).
217. Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007).
218. See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 360–61 (Del. 1997)
(discussing the history of Delaware’s use of disinterested appraisers under section 262, until the
statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate that requirement).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (“[I]f the Court is limited to the biased
presentation of the parties, it is often forced to pick and choose from a limited record without the
benefit of objective analysis and opinion. To compensate for this handicap, the Court of Chancery
should consider, in a proper case, appointing its own expert witness.”).
223. 758 A.2d 485 (Del. 2000).
224. Id. at 487 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)).
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of the corporate legislation in the state. 225 The Delaware legislature is known
to rely on the expertise of the Delaware Bar Association to guide its corporate
lawmaking. 226 As noted by Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller,
rules put forth by the Delaware Bar that increase litigation, such as rules that
stimulate disputes over appraisal rights, could increase legal fees for those
who practice corporate law in Delaware.227 The Delaware Bar’s desire to
keep appraisal arbitrage in its current state was evidenced by its actions
following the Transkaryotic decision that spurred the dramatic increase in
appraisal arbitrage. The Council of the Corporate Law Section of the
Delaware State Bar Association made two reform proposals to section 262,
but notably, the Council did not propose legislation to overrule the
Transkaryotic decision. 228 Although an amendment to use independent
valuation experts in appraisals is adverse to the Delaware Bar Association’s
financial interests, doing so will aid Delaware in maintaining its preeminent
status as the nation’s leading supplier of corporate law.
Because the chancery court’s ability to rely on independent experts is
plainly restricted by the requirement that the court make its own independent
determination of fair value, the Delaware legislature should amend the statute
to allow for such reliance, despite various interest groups’ desires, to better
effectuate the purposes of the dissenting shareholder’s appraisal rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the chancery court abused its discretion
when it used the unaffected thirty-day market price average as fair value
instead of deal price less synergies. 229 The court correctly held there is no
definitive formula for determining fair value, but that deal price is the best
indicator of fair value in this case because the deal was a fully informed,
arm’s-length transaction that occurred after a robust sales process. 230 In
conflicted transactions or transactions with a poorly run sales process, the
deal price is not reflective of fair value, but other valuation methodologies,
225. William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1435 (2020)
(“[A] crucial ingredient in Delaware’s corporate law regime is the legislature’s responsiveness to
local interest groups.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an InterestGroup Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (noting the strongest
interest group in Delaware is an “elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in
the state.”).
226. Moon, supra note 225, at 1435.
227. Macey & Miller, supra note 225, at 504 n.132.
228. See supra note 68.
229. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019)
(en banc) (per curiam).
230. See supra Section IV.A.
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such as the discounted cash flow analysis or comparable companies analysis,
may be better suited for a fair value determination. 231
The practical result of the court’s holding will likely be a decline in
appraisal proceedings, more specifically appraisal arbitrage, in fully
informed, arm’s-length transactions because the deal price will likely serve
as the ceiling for fair value determinations, removing incentive for
arbitrageurs to bring appraisal suits. 232 The decline in appraisal arbitrage
following Aruba will likely lead to positive outcomes by returning the
appraisal remedy to its originally contemplated purpose, to compensate for a
loss of voting rights to dissenting stockholders. 233 Appraisal arbitrage will
not be attractive in instances of an unconflicted, fair price merger; whereas,
mergers completed in conflicted circumstances or objectively priced below
fair value will incentivize appraisal arbitrageurs to seek appraisal and
continue to serve as the market check against abuse by corporate directors,
controlling shareholders, and other insiders in merger transactions. 234
The DFC, Dell, Aruba trilogy also marks general judicial confusion and
discord on proper methodologies to appraise company shares. But, the court
of chancery’s ability to rely on independent experts is plainly restricted by
the statutory requirement that the court make its own independent
determination of fair value. 235 To avoid future judicial confusion in appraisal
proceedings, the Delaware legislature should amend Delaware General
Corporation Law section 262 to allow for a neutral valuation professional to
advise the court of chancery. 236

231. See supra Section II.C.
232. See supra Section IV.B.
233. See supra Section IV.B.
234. See supra Section IV.B.
235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2018); see also Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d
485, 487 (Del. 2000) (noting the use of “a combination special appraisal master/independent expert
witness” to value shares is “contrary to the statutory mandate”).
236. See supra Section IV.C.

